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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES
Stephen Ellmann'
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following excerpts from an initial interview,
fortunately fictional, between a lawyer and a potential client. The
lawyer, Michelle Washington, is a middle-class, white, legal services
lawyer with many years of experience in immigration law. The person
she is interviewing, Massoud Pojolan, is a Kurdish citizen of Iraq. He
maintains that Iraqis loyal to Saddam Hussein persecuted him on the
basis of his ethnicity, along with a great many other ethnic Kurds in
Iraq. If Mr. Pojolan can persuade an asylum officer of the veracity of
his account, he may be eligible for asylum in the United States. If,
however, there are factors justifying an exercise of discretion against
him, he may be subject to deportation.
After some preliminary ice-breaking conversation, the interview
proceeds as follows:
Li: So, Mr. Pojolan, I understand you are interested in applying for
asylum.
Cl: That's right.
L2: For me to understand your case and figure out whether we can
help you, naturally I need to know the facts. Of course, everything
you tell me is confidential. Why don't you tell me a bit about what
happened to you in your home country that led to your wanting to
seek asylum now?

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, New York Law
School.
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[At this point, Mr. Pojolan describes the violent, mass persecution
of ethnic Kurds, such as himself, in certain areas within Iraq. In
response to open-ended questions from Ms. Washington, he describes
killings during anti-Kurdish riots, round-ups and shootings of Kurdish
leaders and their supporters, and massive economic deprivation. Ms.
Washington then shifts the conversation's focus with the following
question:]
L3: Those are shocking events and certainly the kind of thing that
asylum is meant to protect people from. Given what has been
happening in Iraq, I very much hope I can help you with your case.
But you haven't told me very much yet about what happened to you
as an individual during these terrible times; could you tell me more
about that now?
C3: Yes, of course. For a while, nothing happened in my town, but
of course that couldn't last. For me, the troubles began in
November 1999, almost exactly a year ago. They started painting
slogans on my house and throwing garbage.., and other stuff...
over our walls. Everyone knew who was a Kurd and who wasn't,
you see, so once it started there was no escaping it.
L4: Did anything else happen to you?
C4: Well, I saw all kinds of bad stuff happen. But for me
personally.., what happened was a couple of months later, at the
store where I worked with my cousins. I guess they hated us even
more than the others, because we had enough money to have a
store.
L5: What happened at the store, Mr. Pojolan?
C5: There were soldiers and a big crowd of Iraqis, and they were
shouting all kinds of things .... I'd been away at lunch, and I was
just walking back when it started, and all of a sudden it got very bad.
Very, very bad. They kicked down the door of our store, and then
people poured into the shop. I couldn't see what they did inside the
shop, but I could hear screams.., terrible screams.., and then I
saw my cousins ....
[Mr. Pojolan paused at this point and was obviously upset. After
giving him time to take several deep breaths and getting him a glass of
water, which he drank, Ms. Washington resumed:]
L6: You were saying that you saw your cousins...
C6: Yes. These were my own family. I grew up with them. They
were good people .... Anyway, I saw them try to get out of the
store. People were grabbing them and hitting them, and they were
trying to get away. But they didn't get away. I saw them dying, and
I couldn't help them.
L7: [Gently] There was nothing you could do about it, was there?
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C7: No, nothing. Except run. I did run, too. I had to. People in the
crowd were starting to point at me, and I could see that I was next. I
turned around and ran as fast as I could straight out of there. I
could hear them laughing, and somebody yelled, "We'll be coming
for you next." I managed to get across town, and I hid in an old
warehouse. I had nowhere else I could go, because I couldn't trust
my own neighbors. I stayed there for three full days and nights. I
stole a little food and water, otherwise I would have starved.
L8: Then did you leave the country?
C8: I wanted to, but it wasn't easy. First, I moved to another town
where things weren't quite so crazy. And then I started trying to get
out of the country, but it took me six months to find a way to slip
across the border into Turkey. Of course I couldn't stay in
Turkey-I knew that-but from there I managed to get here.
L9: Why did it take so long?
C9: Because you had to pay to get out. Not officially, you
understand, but you couldn't get out without one bribe, and then
another, and then another. And some people were so scared of
Saddam you couldn't even bribe them. I was lucky to manage it as
soon as I did.
L10: How were you able to live during this time?
C10: Oh, well, that wasn't such a big problem. I found some people
I knew, and they gave me a place to stay and enough to eat, and I
returned the favor by helping them with whatever they needed
doing.
L1i: What kind of stuff was that?
C11: Mostly I drove a truck for them, making pickups and
deliveries. It was mostly just regular stuff, I mean, nothing to worry
about and not illegal, you know, or anything like that.
L12: I'm not sure I understand. Was some of the stuff you were
carrying not what you call "regular stuff"?

C12: This is all confidential, right?
L13: Certainly.
C13: Well, mostly it was just food, clothes, rugs-really all right,
perfectly legal. But a couple of times the guy who owned the truck
would ride in the truck with me and he'd say, "Okay, Massoud,
tonight we'll have a special ride, huh?" I didn't like this at all, but I
felt like I couldn't refuse to drive, because this man was helping me
so much. So I tried to just laugh and go about the driving.
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L14: Did the truck owner ever tell you what was in the truck those
times?
C14: No.
L15: So you really don't know what you might have been carrying
then?
C15: I know. I had to help unload it.
L1 6: What was it?
C1 6: Drugs.
L17: Illegal drugs?
C17: Yes.
L18: I think you'd better tell me, as precisely as you can, which
drugs you were carrying, how much of them, and how many times.
[Mr. Pojolan said nothing, and after a brief pause Ms. Washington
went on:]
L19: Please remember, Mr. Pojolan, that what you tell me is
confidential. But I do have to know the truth if I am going to
represent you effectively. This is a crucial matter, Mr. Pojolan, and
if you don't feel you can tell me the truth, you need to understand
that then I will not be able to take your case at all.
C19: All right, all right. Opium.
L20: How often?
C20: Just a few times. Three or four times in the six months.
L21: Three or four separate times? Not just a couple?
C21: Yeah.
L22: And how much? How much each time?
C22: Not much.
L23: How much?
C23: Mostly just a few kilos.
L24: [Grimly] What was the largest amount?
C24: The biggest was 100 kilos.
L25: You carried 100 kilos of opium?
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C25: Yes. I told you, my friend asked me to do it. I had to. It was
like returning all the favors he was doing for me.
L26: Did you get paid extra for this favor?
C26: He'd hand me a hundred dollars at the end of the trips. But I
didn't think of it as pay.
[At this point, Ms. Washington stopped taking notes and closed up
her note pad. Then she said:]
L27: Mr. Pojolan, I wish what you've just told me had never
happened. But since it did happen, I have to tell you that your drug
transporting is either an absolute bar to your getting asylum or it's a
factor the government can and likely will hold against you in
deciding whether to grant you asylum even if you otherwise are
entitled to it.

C27: But does it have to come out at all?
L28: Maybe not. You may never get asked these questions. But
they may come up-not these questions, maybe, but others that may
get at all this. And whatever you are asked, you'll have to tell the
truth. And if you don't, I'll have to reveal the truth myself.
C28: But you said it was all confidential.
Did Ms. Washington handle this interview appropriately? From
one perspective, the answer is yes. She obviously needed to know
what forms of persecution her potential client had suffered in order to
assess his chances of convincing the Immigration and Naturalization
Service that he should receive asylum. Her initial question (L10)
about how Mr. Pojolan survived during the six months he waited to
get out of the country was a natural one, because she already knew
that he had lost his store and that other Kurds were facing economic
deprivation too. She naturally would have wanted to get a complete
account of his experiences. When he surprised her by answering in a
way that seemed to imply he had engaged in some activity that wasn't
"regular" (Cl), she had no alternative but to inquire further, because
she knew that illegal activity in the home country could amount to a
reason to deny asylum. His answers, moreover, never gave her any
reason to stop inquiring, so she pressed on to the bitter end. When
she learned, finally, that he had transported drugs, she could tell him2
only what she did-that this information might be fatal to his case,
2. She was right on this point. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (West 1999) (barring eligibility for asylum where "there are serious
reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside
the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States"). Even if this
conduct does not raise a mandatory bar to asylum, it may weigh heavily in the
discretionary decision whether to grant asylum to an eligible applicant. Carol A.
Buckler, Asylum, Withholding of Removal, Refitgee Status and TPS, in Immigration
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and that neither the client nor the lawyer could deny the facts if they
became an issue in the case.
From another perspective, the answer to the question of whether
Ms. Washington handled this interview appropriately would be no.
Ms. Washington did her best to win her client's confidence by
employing the kinds of techniques we urge lawyers to use as a matter
of good, standard interviewing: ice-breaking at the start, expressing
her desire to help (L3), confirming that she shared his outrage at what
happened (L3), offering personal attention and patience when her
client became upset (after C5), and communicating empathy (L7). In
addition, she repeatedly assured her client that what he told her was
confidential, not only at the start of the interview (L2), but also when
she and her client began discussing what turned out to be the drug
transporting issue (L13). The third time she assured him of
confidentiality (L19), Ms. Washington also reiterated that she needed
the information in order to represent Mr. Pojolan effectively. With all
of these assurances to help her elicit answers, she asked questions that
became decidedly more narrow and closed-ended, emphatic and
insistent, even alarmed. It was only after her client grudgingly
acknowledged the most damaging facts that Ms. Washington revealed
two crucial points: first, the information she had just extracted (but
which she had been aiming at for some time) was very damaging to
the client's interests, and second, the client might be unable to keep
this information secret, because if he was asked about it and tried to
deny it, she would reveal it herself. In other words, only after telling
the client that the information he shared with her would be
confidential did Ms. Washington reveal how little that confidentiality
was worth.
This dialogue raises a series of questions on interviewing ethics and
skills, subjects which are the focus of this chapter.' In the sections to
come, we will consider the following issues:
First, is getting the whole truth always the right objective in
interviewing? Should Ms. Washington have regarded it as her duty to
pursue the facts about the drug deliveries?
Second, are lawyers who have elicited the truth either obliged or
permitted to disclose it over the client's objection? Was Ms.
Washington right that she could reveal what her client might want to
keep hidden?
Third, what advice on confidentiality is consistent with the actual
extent of lawyers' duty of disclosure? Should Ms. Washington have
given the broad and repeated assurances of confidentiality that she
did, and should she have revealed the important qualification on these

Law and Procedure: Desk Edition § 29.04 (Stanley Mailman ed., 2000).

3. See supra note 1.
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assurances-that she could reveal false testimony by her client-only
deep into their meeting?
Fourth, what advice can lawyers give clients about the law that
bears on the clients' situations without compromising the lawyers'
obligations to truth? Here, should Ms. Washington have explained
the legal significance of drug transporting before, or after, asking the
client about it?
Fifth, how skeptical should lawyers be of their clients' veracity?
Here, for example, should Ms. Washington have accepted her client's
half-truths (for example, his answer (C13) that he was mostly
transporting innocuous items such as food, clothes, and rugs) as
sufficient answers to her questions?
Sixth, when lawyers do need to press their clients for the truth, how
should they do this? Was Ms. Washington justified in using the rather
peremptory, demanding questions that she did?
We turn to these questions from a particular starting point. As we
will explain elsewhere in this book,4 we see the lawyer's role first and
foremost as a helping one, and we believe that lawyers are justified in
helping clients, because clients have a right to be helped. Without
shutting our eyes for a moment to the realities of human frailty, we
understand the proposition that clients have a right to be helped as
implying at least a measure of respect for the clients, for their
individual attributes, or at any rate for the humanity they share with
their attorneys. We believe that this respect implies a presumptionto be sure, a rebuttable presumption-that clients are worthy of
respect, or in other words that they are capable of fidelity to the truth
and of attachment to others. Some clients will disprove these
presumptions, and in a society governed by law, even these clients will
enjoy the right to counsel. Nevertheless, we see the paradigmatic
lawyer-client relationship as one between two honorable, or at least
potentially honorable, people.
I. Is TRuTH ALWAYS THE OBJECTIVE?
Ordinarily, it is in the client's interest for his lawyer to know the
truth. A lawyer represents her client best when she knows all of the
relevant circumstances. Only wvith this complete knowledge can a
lawyer present the client's case or position in the most favorable light,
avoid disastrous surprises, devise strategies to handle whatever weak
points exist as well as they can be handled, and ensure that the
eventual outcome of the case fits the client's actual wishes and
interests as accurately as possible. For pragmatic and professional
reasons, therefore, seeking the truth makes sense.

4. See supra note 1.
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Is there any downside to the lawyer's complete knowledge of the
facts? Not if that knowledge imposes no constraints on the lawyer's
freedom of action. For example, American lawyers take for granted
that a lawyer may represent a criminal defendant who pleads "not
guilty" and vigorously defend the case, even if the lawyer knowsfrom the client's own admissions and the lawyer's corroborating
investigation -that the client is guilty as charged. The lawyer remains
free to contest the charges no matter how fully she has become
convinced of their validity.
In many other circumstances, however, it is conceivable that the
lawyer might know too much. We discuss the obligations that
possessing such knowledge may impose in more detail in Part II.
Here, it is enough to say that in all representations, lawyers are
forbidden from making knowingly false statements of fact. In civil
cases, they may not affirm or deny claims if they have no basis for
doing so, may not knowingly introduce false evidence, and must
correct evidence they have already offered if they come to know that
it is false. Similar obligations apply to criminal prosecutors and may
apply even to criminal defense attorneys. In short, knowledge may be
empowering, but it may also be disempowering.
Of course, all of these constraints vanish if, as is sometimes argued,
lawyers never know the truth or falsity of any proposition. Monroe
Freedman calls one version of this approach "the Roy Cohn
solution."5 Freedman, who considers this solution unacceptable,
quotes Cohn as saying:
Before a client could get three words out, any lawyer with half a
brain would say, "You probably don't know whether you're guilty or
not, because you don't know the elements of the crime you're
charged with."
[Then, to avoid hearing what I'm not supposed to hear, I ask the
client:] "If someone was going to get up on the stand and lie about
you, who would it be? And what would they lie about?" 6 And if the
client's got any brains, he'll know what I'm talking about.
Freedman goes on to explain:
Under Mr. Cohn's solution, therefore, the lawyer has it both
ways. For tactical purposes, he knows what he has to know. For
purposes of any ethical obligation, however, he does not know either
that the client is guilty or that the client
is going to commit perjury
7
when he denies the "lies" about him.
Cohn seems to know, in all but name, exactly what he does not want
5. Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 119 (1990).
6. David Berreby, On Trial: The Cohn/Dershowitz Debate, Nat'l L.J., June 7,
1982, at 15, quoted in Freedman, supra note 5, at 119.
7. Freedman, supra note 5,at 119.
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to know. A more palatable approach might assert that only the jury
can "know" the truth under our system of law. Yet another approach
could invoke a modem, or post-modem, skepticism about the
ascertainability of truth.
But this sort of denial of knowledge has two tremendous, and in our
view fatal, disadvantages. The first is that it requires lawyers, who like
everyone else no doubt believe that they "know" many things about
many subjects, to profess utter lack of knowledge about matters they
should be studying especially carefully, namely the facts of their cases.
In other words, it requires lawyers to disclaim common sense.
The second disadvantage to disclaiming knowledge in this fashion is
that it requires lawyers to assert that the many provisions in the
professional codes of ethics which forbid lawyers from using or
uttering knowing falsehoods are actually mere pretense, because they
will never, ever have any bearing on lawyers' actual duties. We do not
suggest that lawyers should casually assume they know the falsity of
their clients' statements. On the contrary, we feel that the test for
knowledge should be a demanding one, perhaps on the order of
"beyond a reasonable doubt."8 Precisely because such a test will not
be satisfied easily, it fits with the lawyer's primary orientation as the
representative and helper of her client (and fits especially well in the
field of criminal defense where it is a truism that the defendant has the
right to put the state to its proof). Nevertheless, lawyers must
acknowledge that sometimes they know that they are hearing ies.
Even if knowledge exists and can be constraining, we would have no
alternative but to seek it if we could not conceive of any other way to
conduct an interview. Thus, it might be argued that there is nothing
else lawyers can seek in interviews except the whole truth, for no other
interviewing objective would be coherent. That, however, is probably
not true. In criminal defense work, for example, the lawyer's goal
could conceivably be the "collection of facts so that he can evaluate
the extent to which inculpatory information is accessible to the
government and usable to frame an indictment." 9 To achieve this
goal, the lawyer must learn what the government knows and what it
will have the legal ability to discover, but the lawyer does not
necessarily have to learn the entire truth from the client's own mouth.
Interviewing focused on this objective might start with an inquiry into
everything the client knows about the state's case against him or her,

8. For an overview of the various standards courts have applied to this question,
see Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 294-95 (2d ed. 1995). The
proposed Restatement suggests a "firm factual basis" standard. Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 180 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) [hereinafter
Restatement].
9. Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at
Work 38 (1985).
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and only then (if at all) ask for the client's explanation of the
information thus assembled.
Scott Turow, a novelist and former federal prosecutor, illustrates
this mode of defense practice in his novel Presumed Innocent. In this
novel, Rusty Sabich, a senior prosecutor, finds himself accused of
murder and turns for his defense to his longtime adversary Sandy
Stern. Stern takes the case. At one of their early meetings, the two of
them discuss where the case stands:
"So," he [Stem] says. "Do we now understand Della Guardia's
case?"
"I think I do."
"Fine, then. Let me hear it. Thirty-second summation, if you
please, of Nico's [the prosecutor's] opening statement."10
At this point, Sabich reflects on his meetings with his lawyer:
Sandy Stem, with whom I have done business for better than a
decade, against whom I have tried half a dozen cases, and who on
matters of gravity, or of little consequence, has always known that
he could accept my word-Sandy Stem has never asked me if I did
it.... Perhaps he does not ask because he is not certain of the verity
of the answer he may get. It is a given of the criminal justice system,
an axiom as certain as the laws of gravity, that defendants rarely tell
the truth....
Thus it would be an act contrary to his professional acumen were
Sandy Stern to commit himself to an unreserved faith in everything I
say. Instead, he does not ask. The procedure has one further virtue.
If I were to meet any new evidence by frontally contradicting what I
had told Sandy in the past, legal ethics might require him to
withhold me from the witness stand, where I almost certainly intend
to go. Better to see everything the prosecution has, to be certain
that my recollection, as the lawyers put it, has been fully
"refreshed," before Sandy inquires about my version. Caught in a
system where the client is inclined to lie and the lawyer who seeks
his client's confidence may not help him do that, Stern works in the
small open spaces which remain. Most of all, he desires to make an
intelligent presentation. He does not wish to be misled, or to have
his options curbed by rash declarations that prove to be untrue. As
the trial approaches, he will need to know more. He may ask the
question then; and I certainly will tell him the answer. For the time
being, Stem has found, 1as usual, the most artful and indefinite
means by which to probe.'

10. Scott Turow, Presumed Innocent 161 (Farrar Straus Giroux 1987) (This and
the following excerpt from PresumedInnocent, copyright ©1987 by Scott Turow, are
reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC.).
11. Id. at 161-62.
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Criminal defense work, of course, differs from most other legal
representation in a crucial way: the client does not have to testify or
offer evidence against himself. Such strategic interviewing is harder to
imagine in other legal contexts where the client is ultimately going to
be subject to the probing of an adverse attorney or adjudicator. But
even in these circumstances, it is possible to conceive of other
interviewing objectives besides seeking "the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth." The lawyer here might aim to learn those
facts necessary to make out the client's case and to refute the likely
contentions of the other side, but choose not to press her inquiries so
far as to unearth damaging matters that the opposition most likely
would overlook; if the lawyer could calibrate her inquiries to this goal,
she could learn all she needs to in order to help her client, without
learning additional information that would hurt his case.
There may be many conscientious lawyers who would endorse such
an approach, but as a general matter we cannot join them. We reject
this strategy, first of all, on professional grounds, because we fear it
would undermine effective representation of clients. We are skeptical
about the ability of most lawyers, and most clients, to conduct
carefully-structured dialogues with enough finesse to ensure that the
lawyer learns what she must but does not hear what she would rather
not. While we do not favor random probing for damaging
information,' we believe that the lawyer is most likely to learn what
she needs to know if she does not try to circumscribe her search for
the facts.
Moreover, we see the lawyer's effort to avoid excessive knowledge
as deeply inconsistent with important moral premises of lawyers'
work. Lawyers who disregard the goal of truth with their clients are
implicitly assuming-normally, no doubt, without expressly discussing
the point with the client themselves-that the clients prefer selfinterest to truth. This assumption denies clients the respect we
believe they are due as human beings and is thus inconsistent with a
basic foundation of the lawyer-client relationship. 13 We worry, also,
that a relationship marked at its inception by avoidance of truth may
grow worse rather than better over time. Clients who have avoided
one truth with the lawyer's aid may avoid other truths as well, even
against the lawyer's wishes. Lawyers who might seek, for example, to
counsel their clients about ethical matters may find that their standing
to do so has been impaired. Additionally, lawyers who seek to avoid
the burden of knowledge compromise their fidelity to the ethical
12. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
13. Cf. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor.at-Law.
Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 Houston L Rev. 327, 331 (1998) (arguing that

"[l]awyers who prohibit client confession ... ignore the possibility that the client
might seek goals other than freedom, such as forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear
conscience; they ignore the possibility that the client might want to confess").
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obligations with respect to truth that we have already mentioned. As
we will see shortly, these compromises may not amount to breaches of
the rules, but they do depart from a full commitment to working
within the bounds of the truth.
Even more fundamentally, we see such stratagems as inconsistent
with the function of lawyers in a just legal system. Lawyers in an
adversarial system are not bound to assist the tribunal in seeking the
truth-that formulation has a more inquisitorial than adversarial
flavor to it-but we as a society do not have lawyers in order to enable
people to prevail on false claims. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility states the proposition, or truism, that members of our
society are entitled to zealous representation "within the bounds of
the law," so that everyone in our society will be able "to have his
conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law."' 4 Nor do
we protect attorney-client confidentiality in order to enable lawyer
and client to cleverly skirt the truth in the privacy of the lawyer's
office. On all these grounds, we agree with Ms. Washington's desire
to discern the truth.
In the face of these arguments, however, it is somewhat startling to
realize that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as the
Model Code, do not explicitly state that the duty of the lawyer is to
seek the truth from her client. The ABA has suggested that lawyers
who avoid "knowledge" by "not questioning the client about the facts
in the case... may be violating their duties under R[u]le 3.3 [to
prevent and correct the use of false testimony] and their obligation to
provide competent representation under Rule .1.'
But these
implications, plausible as they are, are not explicitly confirmed by the
texts. Moreover, the proposed Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers also stops distinctly short of imposing such a duty. Instead,
lawyers generally owe their clients "the competence and diligence
normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances."1 6 A
comment explains that this duty requires lawyers to "perform tasks
reasonably appropriate to the representation, including, where
appropriate, inquiry into facts"-but this language does not specify
the tenor of that inquiry.17 As for the duty not to knowingly use false
evidence, the Restatement comments that "[a]ctual knowledge does
not include unknown information, even if a reasonable lawyer would
have discovered it through inquiry."'" So, too, with the duty not to
14. Model Code of Prof 1Responsibility EC 7-1 (1981) [hereinafter Model Code].
15. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 n.9
(1987).
16. Restatement, supra note 8, § 74(1).
17. Id. cmt. c.
18. Id. § 180 cmt. c. In a similar vein, the Restatement posits that lawyers are
generally not liable to non-clients for negligent misrepresentation, which might result
from a factual inquiry not aimed at the truth. Id. § 77 cmt. f. Lawyers are also not
liable for malicious prosecution if the lawyer acts with "probable cause," id. § 78(2),
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assist a client in action that the lawyer knows is criminal: "[A] lawyer
is not required to make a particular kind of investigation in order to
ascertain more certainly what the facts are, although it will often be
prudent for the lawyer to do so."' 9
While other sources of law may impose greater obligations,2' within
the framework of the Restatement the main limit on competent,
willed ignorance seems to be the doctrine of "conscious avoidance."
Under this doctrine, a lawyer who deliberately avoids knowledge may
be charged with having that knowledge. 2' As David Luban has
pointed out, however, it is not necessarily the case that a person who
avoids learning whether something is true or not actually knows that it
is true.' Sandy Stern, in Presumed Innocent, may ultimately learn
that Rusty Sabich is guilty, or that he is innocent. The view of the
Restatement Reporter, Charles W. Wolfram, is consistent with this
recognition; that view is that "the preferable rule is that proof of a
lawyer's conscious disregard of facts is relevant evidence which,
together with other evidence bearing on the question, may warrant a
finding of actual knowledge." ' ' Under this view, a lawyer who simply
did not ask certain questions, but had no clear indication of what the
answers to those questions would be, would seem to lack the
"knowledge" upon which the Restatement places so much weight.
To say that lawyers are not legally obliged to seek the truth,
however, provides no affirmative reason to depart from the ethical
principles we have already sketched that call for lawyers to try to
learn the truth. It might be argued, however, that even honorable
people, when caught within an unjust system, do not owe the
operators of that system truth. In principle, we agree. A Jew in Nazi
Germany did not have an obligation to reveal his Jewishness to those
who would kill him for it, even if he had to lie under oath in a court of
law to keep the truth concealed. But we are not in Nazi Germany.
Although American society and American law are far from perfect,

and a comment declares: "Whether probable cause existed is determined on the basis
of the facts known to the lawyer at the time." Id. cmt. d. The Reporter's Note refers
to "the rule that probable cause is appraised on the basis of the information available
to the lawyer, without any requirement of investigation," id. Reporter's Note on cmt.
d, though citing one contrary decision, Nelson v. Miller, 607 P.2d 438, 448-49 (Kan.
1980).
19. Restatement, supra note 8, § 151 cmt. g.
20. For example, as the Restatement observes, procedural rules like Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure typically require lawyers to undertake "an
inquiry about facts and law that is reasonable in the circumstances." Id. § 170 ant. c.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1310 (5th Cir. 1994) (approving

"deliberate ignorance" instruction "where the evidence shows (1) subjective

awareness of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct, and (2) purposeful
contrivance to avoid learning of the illegal conduct"); Wyle v. RJ. Reynolds Indus.,
Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 1983) (similar).
22. See David Luban, Contrived Ignorance,87 Geo. LJ.957, 959, 961-62 (1999).
23. Restatement, supra note 8, § 151 Reporter's Note on cmt. g.
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perfection is not an attainable goal in life. We believe that the
protections of constitutional rights and the rule of law in the United
States, as well as the potential for democratic changes in unjust
policies, provide strong justification for requiring lawyers-who have
chosen to enter their profession and taken an oath of fidelity to the
law-to offer their clients representation only within the bounds of
the law.
As we have just seen, however, "the bounds of the law" are not as
tight as might have been expected. Instead, it appears that they leave
some room for lawyers to calibrate their inquiry into truth, through
the questions they ask and do not ask and also, as we will see, through
such means as the advice they give about the limits on confidentiality
for the clients' answers. If we lived in a perfectly just society, there
might be no justification for the existence of such discretion. But in
the imperfect world and nation in which we live, there may well be
circumstances where the lawyer's full discovery of truth, and the
subsequent ethical obligations incurred by such knowledge, will lead
to results that she conscientiously sees as unjust. The lawyer who
learns of a welfare client's petty fraud, for example, may be unable to
press the client's claim for benefits essential to health or life. Exactly
where justice ultimately lies in such a conflict between law's demands
and equity's claims may be a profound philosophical problem, but the
rules of professional ethics do not exist to resolve all such problems.
Instead, within their boundaries, discretion remains for multiple, even
differing moral perspectives. Put more concretely, the rules of
professional duty leave no room for knowing violations, but they do
leave some room for not knowing. 24
Had Ms. Washington believed that the denial of asylum to people
with past criminal histories was profoundly unjust, she might have
considered exercising this sort of discretion here. Before she asked
Mr. Pojolan what "[ir]regular" items he transported, however, she
could not know his answer. For her to be sure that denial of asylum
based on that answer would be unjust, she would have to hold the
view that Mr. Pojolan was entitled to asylum (assuming the other
requirements of asylum law were satisfied) no matter what he was
transporting. Would she maintain that view if the cargo had been, for
instance, children enslaved into prostitution? If not, then her decision
not to ask would have to factor in the possibility that she was
becoming a party to injustice rather than justice. Additionally, she
would need to believe that getting an answer to her question would
be, as a tactical matter, more of a hindrance than a help. But if Mr.
Pojolan's criminal conduct is actually limited, as he maintains
throughout, then such a tactical judgment might be entirely wrong.
24. David Luban's insightful article develops a similar argument. See Luban, supra
note 22, at 978-79.
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She obviously would not want to learn this information for the first
time during Mr. Pojolan's asylum interview, when it would be too late
to explore possible mitigating circumstances. Deciding what to do
once she has the information may be difficult, but not asking requires
her to make a similar decision in the dark. In sum, we doubt that this
case would have been an appropriate one for the exercise of such
discretion in the name of justice, and we suspect that similar
considerations will frequently weigh against lawyers' choosing this
course.
II. How COMPLETE IS CONFIDENTIALITY?

Three times in the dialogue, Ms. Washington assures her client that
what he tells her is confidential. Each of these assurances is
unqualified. Perhaps she was right to speak in these terms,2 but it is
clear that she was not accurate. The truth is that what clients tell
lawyers is not simply, and unqualifiedly, confidential. The exact
contours of the limits on confidentiality vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction,' but we can briefly outline some of the leading
restrictions.27
Our primary focus here is on the confidentiality protected by the
codes of legal ethics. Confidentiality under the codes is a considerably
broader notion than the attorney-client privilege. First of all, it
prohibits, or purports to prohibit, all disclosures, not just those made
in testimony. Additionally, it protects from disclosure a much wider
range of information. The difference in scope is reflected in DR 4-101
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which explains that
the ethics rule protects both "confidences" and "secrets."'
Confidences consist of "information protected by the attorneyclient privilege under applicable law."' Wolfram offers the following
"general encapsulation" of the scope of the privilege:
(1) a person (client) who seeks legal advice or assistance (2) from a
lawyer acting in behalf of the client, (3) for an indefinite time may
invoke, and the lawyer must invoke in the client's behalf, an
unqualified privilege not to testify (4) concerning the contents of a
client communication (5) that was made by the client or by the
client's communicative agent (6) in confidence (7) to the lawyer or

25. See infra Part III for a discussion of this issue.
26. Lawyers and law students handling actual cases will of course need to consult
the particular confidentiality rules of the jurisdictions in which they are practicing.
27. For a detailed analysis of all the limits on confidentiality, keyed to the relevant
provisions of the Model Code, see Roy M. Sobelson, Lawyers, Clients and Assurances
of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking Without Speaking, Clients Hearing Without
Listening, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 703, 717-71 (1988). We have benefited from this
discussion in the following pages.
28. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 4-101(A).
29. Id.
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the lawyer's confidential agent, (8)unless the client expressly or by
implication waives the privilege.

In addition to shielding such privileged information, DR 4-101 also
protects "secrets"-"other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client. '31 Model Rule 1.6 is, if anything, broader in
scope than DR 4-101: the Model Rule protects "information relating
to representation of a client '32 and not just the various forms of
"information gained in the professional relationship" encompassed in
the Code's definition of "secrets.

'33

Broad as the protections under

the Code and Rules are, however, they are also subject to profound
limitations.
First, both the Model Code and the Model Rules authorize

disclosure to prevent the client from committing future crimes.34 The
Model Code allows such disclosure in all cases,35 but the Model Rules
more narrowly permit such disclosure only to prevent crimes likely to
cause death or serious injury.36

Neither the Model Code nor the

Model Rules ever explicitly requires disclosure on this basis, 37 but
there are some states that do.38

Moreover, the Model Rules, as

currently interpreted, require lawyers to carry out "noisy"
withdrawals from representation-withdrawals accompanied by
notification to adverse parties that the lawyer disavows prior
assertions on the client's behalf-when the lawyer learns that those
39
assertions are fraudulent and the client will not correct them.
30. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 6.3.1 (1986).
31. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 4-101(A).
32. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules].
33. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 4-101(A).
34. A related doctrine in the law of attorney-client privilege, the "crime-fraud
exception," makes clear that statements made by the client in the course of using the
lawyer's services to further a crime or fraud are not privileged. See Wolfram, supra
note 30, § 6.4.10.
35. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 4-101(C)(3).
36. Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.6(b)(1).
37. Both provisions are phrased permissively. The comment to Rule 1.6 explicitly
states that "[a] lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by [this
section] does not violate this Rule." Id. R. 1.6 cmt. Sobelson observes that footnote
16 to DR 4-101(C)(3) seems to suggest that disclosure could sometimes be obligatory,
but he also comments that "[t]he exact persuasive force of a footnote is not clear."
Sobelson, supra note 27, at 739 n.180; see Model Code, supra note 14, Preamble n.1.
38. States imposing mandatory duties of disclosure include Florida, Illinois, New
Jersey, and Virginia. The relevant provisions are excerpted in Stephen Gillers & Roy
D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 76-78 (1995). For a
state-by-state tabulation of rules prohibiting, permitting, or requiring disclosure of
otherwise confidential information revealing the client's criminal or fraudulent
conduct, see Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 117B Reporter's Note
(Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
39. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992);
see Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.6 cmt.
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Second, both the Model Code and the Model Rules prohibit
lawyers from making false statements of fact, or knowingly using false
evidence, in the course of their representation of clients.' These
duties quite clearly prevent lawyers in civil cases from making
assertions that they know to be false, or offering testimony (at least
from witnesses other than the client himself) that they know to be
false.4 ' Just how far these duties reach in criminal cases may be
debated, but the Model Rules plainly
are meant to impose obligations
42
in criminal as well as civil cases.
Third, both the Model Code and the Model Rules also have
provisions authorizing, and in fact requiring, disclosure to correct
client perjury. The Model Code's provision contains an exception that
seems to swallow the rule, so that under the Code, lawyers seemingly
could report that their clients intended to commit perjury-as a future
crime-but could not correct it after it occurred.43 Under the Model
Rules, on the other hand, while lawyers ordinarily cannot report their
clients' intention to commit perjury as a future crime, because
normally perjury does not result in anyone's death or substantial
bodily harm, they can, and apparently must, take "reasonable
remedial measures" to correct it once it has happened-even at the
cost of disclosing confidential communications, and even in criminal
cases.' This is what Ms. Washington threatens to do at the end of the
dialogue (L28), and in those jurisdictions that follow the Model Rules,
what she threatens is no more than her duty.
40. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 7-102(A)(4) & (5); Model Rules, supra note
32, R. 3.3.

41. See Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 3.3 cmt.
42. The comment to Rule 3.3 states: "The general rule-that an advocate must
disclose the existence of perjury with respect to a material fact, even that of a clientapplies to defense counsel in criminal cases, as well as in other instances." Id. R. 3.3
cmt. It goes on to acknowledge, however, that some jurisdictions have interpreted
constitutional safeguards for criminal defendants as giving defendants a right to insist
that counsel present their testimony even when the lawyer knows it is false, and states

that "[t]he obligation of the advocate under these Rules is subordinate to such a
constitutional requirement." L
43. The provision in question is DR 7-102(B)(1), which begins by declaring that
"[a] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that... [his client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable

to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal," and then-by

virtue of a 1974 amendment-declares that this obligation does not apply "when the
information is protected as a privileged communication." Model Code, supra note 14,
DR 7-102(B)(1).

ABA Ethics Opinion 341 completed the evisceration of this

disclosure duty by interpreting the words "privileged communication" here to include
all confidential information under DR 4-101. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975); Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers:
Problems of Law and Ethics 377-78 (5th ed. 1998). Gillers notes, however, that "[a]
majority of jurisdictions refused to subscribe to the reversed priorities of the 1974
amendment." Id. at 378.
44. Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 3.3(a)(4) & cmts.
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Fourth, both the Model Code and the Model Rules permit lawyers
to disclose confidential information when necessary to protect
themselves against charges of misconduct." It is notable that these
charges need not be made by the erstwhile client; instead, the lawyer
may disclose the client's confidential communications to demonstrate
to a prosecutor, for example, that she (the lawyer) was not in league
with the client in some improper scheme.46 Moreover, a Model Rule
comment indicates that the "charges" need not have ripened to the
stage of litigation or prosecution; the lawyer may disclose information
in order to prevent matters from ever reaching such a point.47
Fifth, lawyers may make disclosures if such disclosures are
impliedly authorized as necessary to the representation.48 If the
lawyer believes that a particular matter must be disclosed in the
course of representation in order to achieve the client's goals, for
example, the lawyer may do so without explicit authorization.
Although clients can certainly countermand such implicit authority,
lawyers will frequently exercise this discretion in circumstances where
clients will not be able to object until, from their point of view, it is
already too late.49

Sixth, lawyers may make disclosures with the client's consent." As
a matter of theory, this is not an exception to client confidentiality at
all, because no one questions that clients can waive confidentiality
whenever they wish. But in practice, this may be an important limit
on confidentiality, because lawyers have substantial power to press, or
even coerce, their clients into giving such consent. The client whose
lawyer threatens to withdraw from the case unless the client
authorizes some disclosure, for example, may justly feel that the
confidentiality of his communications is less than absolute. 51
45. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 4-101(C)(4); Model Rules, supra note 32, R.
1.6(b)(2).
46. See Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.6 cmt.
47. Id. ("The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity
has been made.").
48. Id. R. 1.6(a). The Model Code contains a similar provision, but only in an
Ethical Consideration. Model Code, supra note 14, EC 4-2 (disclosure permitted
"when necessary to perform [the lawyer's] professional employment").
49. As Sobelson notes, if a client attempted to restrict such disclosures so sharply
that the lawyer could not competently handle the matter, the lawyer would be obliged
to withdraw. Sobelson, supra note 27, at 726-27; see Model Code, supra note 14, DR
2-110(B)(2) (requiring withdrawal if "continued employment will result in violation of
Disciplinary Rule") & DR 6-101 (regarding "Failing to Act Competently"); Model
Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.16(a)(1) (providing for mandatory withdrawal if "the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct") & R. 1.1
("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.").
50. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 4-101(C)(1) (permitting disclosure "with the
consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them");
Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.6(a) (permitting disclosure if "client consents after
consultation").
51. The grounds on which lawyers can seek to withdraw from a case-and so the
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This is not a complete catalogue. 52 Moreover, no complete
catalogue of the limitations the Model Code and Model Rules place
on confidentiality is possible, for the laws of confidentiality and
privilege are always subject to development and reconsideration, just
as other laws are. This proposition is vividly illustrated by the
continuing litigation pursued by Kenneth Starr over the dimensions of
attorney-client privilege in the relationships between government
attorneys and officials.53 Given this inescapable uncertainty, it is
impossible to fully and precisely describe the confidentiality of client
communications. Even leaving that aside, it is clear that any
reasonably comprehensive statement of the law of confidentiality
must include a number of qualifications on the scope of confidentiality
permitted by the laws and rules of ethics.
III. ADVISING THE CLIENT ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY

It follows from what we have said in Part II that Ms. Washington's
advice about confidentiality was incomplete and inaccurate. It does
not necessarily follow that she should have said something different.
To decide whether she should have chosen other words, we might
begin by considering whether there are ways to make Ms.
Washington's statement that "everything you tell me is confidential"
more accurate without making radical changes to the basic approach
she uses. Consider the following possibilities:
(a) "Everything you tell me is confidential as provided by law."
That statement may be accurate, if "confidential as provided by law"
actually means "confidential to the extent provided by law," but it is
hopelessly obscure.
(b) "Everything you tell me is confidential to the extent provided by
law." This statement avoids some of the ambiguity of the previous
formulation, but the problem with this comment is that if the client
circumstances in which lawyers can threaten their clients with this consequence-are
quite numerous. See Model Code, supra note 14, DR 2-110; Model Rules, supra note
32, R. 1.16.

52. Some important information provided by clients to their lawyers-for

example, the client's identity-is normally not treated as confidential at all. Sobelson,

supra note 27, at 716. Even otherwise confidential information may also be revealed
in circumstances besides those cited in the text, for example, when required by some

law outside the ethics rules. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 4-101(C)(2) (authorizing
disclosure when "required by law"); Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.6 cmt.
("Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation
beyond the scope of these Rules, but a presumption should exist against such
supersession.").
53. See e.g., In re Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.,
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 525

U.S. 996 (1998). For another example of the Independent Counsel's challenges to

attorney-client privilege, this one unsuccessful, see Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399 (1998) (declining to allow attorney-client privilege to end with the death
of the client).
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really hears it he will know that he hasn't been told anything; whether
his words are confidential at all depends on what "extent" of
protection the law provides, and the lawyer hasn't actually said
anything about that.
(c) "I want you to know that, of course, everything you tell me is
confidential between us to the full extent provided by law." This
statement; delivered with emphasis and a sincere expression, might
lead the client to believe that he had just been assured of
confidentiality, while at the same time the lawyer could accurately say
that she had promised only what the law allowed. This gap between
what is said and what is heard is not a virtue.
(d) "Everything you tell me about what has happened will be
confidential between us." This statement reflects an important
qualification on confidentiality-namely that the client's statements of
criminal future intentions may not be confidential. As such, it is more
accurate than the version in (a), which omitted this and all other
qualifications. But the new formulation is still not accurate. It too
omits the other qualifications,' and it might be taken to imply that
nothing the client says about future intentions is confidential, when, in
fact, information the client provides about his lawful future plans and
actions is protected by confidentiality.
We could go on inventing and critiquing variations of these
assurances. No statement will be perfect, for it is simply not possible
to describe the rules on confidentiality completely, clearly, and
accurately in one or two sentences. To progress further, we must first
step back to recognize what purposes advice about confidentiality
fulfills in a lawyer-client interview. Then we will be in a position to
consider what kind of advice can best achieve those purposes.
One purpose of such advice is to tell the client about the law that
governs his communications with the lawyer. So far, we have been
using the performance of this function as the criterion for assessing
Ms. Washington's advice and the variations on it. As a general
proposition, one of the lawyer's responsibilities in the course of
representing a client is to inform the client of the law bearing on his
situation." It seems reasonable that the lawyer's responsibilities on
this score should also include informing the client of the law bearing
on the client's communications with the lawyer.
54. In some cases, moreover, what the client says about his past conduct may
reveal that he is engaged in continuing criminality, in which case even information
about past conduct may be subject to disclosure via the "future crime" exception. For
a critical appraisal of this basis for disclosure, see Sobelson, supra note 27, at 749-52.
55. Model Code, supra note 14, EC 7-8 ("A lawyer should advise his client of the
possible effect of each legal alternative."); Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.4
(requiring a lawyer to keep the client "reasonably informed about the status of a

matter" and to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit...
informed decisions").
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The second purpose, however, is quite different. Assurances of
confidentiality may be needed to encourage clients to tell the truth to
their lawyers. Clients may be less likely to reveal damaging
information-or helpful information that clients mistakenly think is
damaging-if they do not believe their lawyers will keep what they
said confidential. Clients, however, might not know or assume such
confidentiality exists unless their lawyers explicitly tell them so. The
lawyer's assurance of confidentiality may also serve as a way of
winning the client's trust; if clients do not trust their lawyers, they
surely will not communicate freely with them.
It is worth
remembering that lawyers can use reassurances of confidentiality
strategically (which is not to say "improperly") by reminding clients of
this protection at the very moments when clients are showing
reluctance to speak.
Certainly, there are many reasons for clients to distrust their
lawyers. Aside from the intrinsic difficulty of discussing sensitive
material with any stranger, lawyer-client relationships frequently
present other, potentially significant barriers that need to be
overcome. In the encounter between Ms. Washington and Mr.
Pojolan, for example, lawyer and client differ in ethnicity and
nationality.
The shock Ms. Washington seems to express in
responding to the client's revelations suggests that they differ in social
experience as well-that Ms. Washington is committed to a life guided
by the law, while her potential client has lived more tumultuously.
There may be many other differences as well, both in our imagined
dialogue and in actual lawyer-client relationships. 6 Such differences
may actually be a source of strength in the relationship, and if they are
instead a source of difficulty, we believe they usually can be dealt
with-but they confirm the wisdom of shaping lawyers' interactions
with their clients so as to build client trust as effectively as possible.
Both of these purposes of advice about confidentiality make sense.
Each, however, is subject to important qualifications. Consider first
the goal of informing the client of the law bearing on his situationcertainly, as a general proposition, an important objective. The
lawyer's duty in this regard, however, is not to tell the client every
legal consideration that could possibly bear on the client's situation,
but rather to "explain... to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."'
There is little point in raising issues that are very unlikely to bear on a
client's case. In fact, there is a good reason not to provide such
extraneous information: the lawyer's job is to provide expert
information in clear fashion to a layperson, not to turn that layperson
56. In our dialogue, one point on which lawyer and client do nor differ is language.

In reality, in immigration cases and elsewhere, language barriers may vastly
complicate communication.
57. Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.4(b).
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into a lawyer. Too much information can confuse rather than
enlighten.
The goal of building client trust is also subject to qualification. Fred
Zacharias has pointed out the paucity of "empirical research testing
the benefits of strict confidentiality and the validity of its
justifications."58 As he observes, "[e]ven if a lawyer makes a good
faith effort to explain the rules to clients, the clients are likely to
remain confused at least as to details. '59 In any event it is hardly
certain that a lawyer's assertion to most clients that confidentiality is
unqualified is central to the clients' willingness to speak frankly. 6° In
addition, it is not clear that clients actually believe lawyers provide
absolute confidentiality.6 ' If distrust is endemic, arguably the best
response is not false denial but rather a candid discussion, both of the
possibility of clashes between lawyer and client and of the lawyer's
ethical prerogatives and duties should such a clash arise. 62 We
certainly do not endorse such dialogues as a routine step in initiating a
lawyer-client relationship, but there is, again, little empirical evidence
to support judgments either way.63
Moreover, these two functions-informing the client of the
applicable law and encouraging truthful communication-if taken to
extremes, plainly call for very different kinds of lawyer advice about
confidentiality. To describe the law of confidentiality more or less
fully would require extensive disclosures; Roy M. Sobelson has
developed precisely such a detailed statement. Sobelson argues that
"[b]ecause a truly accurate disclosure is so important, and likely to be
fairly lengthy, to the extent possible it should be made in a written
form, submitted to the client prior to the interview, complete with a
space for the client to indicate his understanding of the terms."' His
suggested form begins with the following admonition:
NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT STATES IMPORTANT LEGAL

RIGHTS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU READ AND SIGN IT
ALL BEFORE YOU CONFER WITH YOUR ATTORNEY. IF
YOU HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT IT, ASK THE ATTORNEY
BEFORE YOU SIGN IT. YOUR SIGNATURE AT THE END
58. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality,74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 353 (1989).
59. Id. at 365.
60. See id. at 386 (reporting on Zacharias' survey finding that only 15.1% of
laypeople surveyed would withhold information "if the lawyer 'promised
confidentiality except for specific types of information which he/she described in
advance"'). But cf. id. at 395 (reporting survey evidence that confidentiality
exceptions might deter 10-25% of clients from confiding in lawyers).

61. See id. at 394.
62. See Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 Geo.
L.J. 1015, 1032-33 (1981).

63. We do, however, see candid discussion of limits on confidentiality as valuable
when those limits are really at issue in a particular case. See infra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
64. Sobelson, supra note 27, at 772.
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WILL SIGNIFY YOUR UNDERSTANDING
MATrERS STATED HERE.6'

OF

THE

The form goes on to spell out the duty of confidentiality and then
identifies five instances in which even confidential information isn't
fully confidential (for example, when information must be revealed in
discovery).' It continues by identifying five categories of information
normally not covered by confidentiality at all (including the client's
identity and statements made to obtain the lawyer's services in
unlawful activity), points out four situations in which the lawyer may
be "FORCED to reveal information" (including compliance with
court orders, correction of client perjury, and prevention of future
crimes by the client), and finally states the exceptions for lawyer selfdefense and for suits to collect the fee the client owes the lawyer.67
The form ends by saying: "IF YOU HAVE READ THE ABOVE
DOCUMENT AND AGREE TO BE BOUND BY ITS TERMS,
PLEASE SIGN BELOW."' r
Ironically, even this form is not exhaustive; it does not, and cannot,
spell out the details of the many confidentiality exceptions to which it
refers. But it does seem safe to say that this form offers advice that, in
many respects, most clients would not need (most clients, for example,
probably have no reason to want to keep their own identity secret).
In addition, this form may become a source of confusion and
distraction at the very beginning of the lawyer-client relationship, a
point at which other matters-above all, hearing the client's story and
concerns-should take precedence.
We believe that a client
confronted with this elaborate set of limits on confidentiality wil not
be likely to emerge reassured about the privacy of his communications
with his lawyer.
We suspect, finally, that requiring a client to focus on, and sign a
form accepting, these limitations before any relationship has been
established may imply to the client that the lawyer fears the client will
soon run afoul of the limits on confidentiality. That implication is not
consistent with our starting presumption that clients are entitled to
respect, and some clients may well feel it as an affront.69 The impact
of such an initial encounter seems likely to make the subsequent
relationship distant and cautious, rather than close and trusting.
On the other hand, advice that would be unqualifiedly reassuring
might have to characterize confidentiality as absolute. Anthony
Amsterdam, for example, has offered a very firmly worded model
statement about confidentiality for use in criminal practice. He argues
that in the early stages of the relationship between the lawyer and a
65.
66.
67.
6&
69.

ld.
Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 773.
1d. at 774.
We thank Tanina Rostain for pointing this out.
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criminal defendant, it is hard for the lawyer to demonstrate concretely
that she deserves the client's trust. One of the few tools available to
the lawyer, Amsterdam suggests, is an emphatic assurance of
confidentiality. He proposes:
Now, I am going to ask you to tell me some things about yourself
and also about this charge they have against you. Before I do, I
want you to know that everything you tell me is strictly private, just
between you and me. Nothing you tell me goes to the police or to
the District Attorney or to the judge or to anybody else. Nobody
can make me tell them what you said to me, and I won't. Maybe
you've heard about this thing that they call the attorney-client
privilege. The law says that when a person is talking to [his] [her]
lawyer, whatever [he] [she] tells the lawyer is confidential and secret
between the two of them. This is because the law recognizes that
the lawyer's obligation is to [his] [her] client and to nobody else; that
the lawyer is supposed to be 100 per cent on the client's side; that
the lawyer is only supposed to help [his] [her] client and never do
anything-or tell anybody anything-that might hurt the client in
any way. The District Attorney is the one who is supposed to
represent the government in prosecuting cases; and the judge's job is
to judge the cases. But the law wants to make sure that-even if
everybody else is lined up against a defendant-there is one person
who is not supposed to look out for the government but to be
completely for the defendant. That is the defendant's lawyer. As
your lawyer, I am completely for you. And I couldn't be completely
for you if I were required to tell anybody else the things that you say
to me in private. So you can trust me and tell me anything you want
without worrying that I will ever pass it along to anyone else because
I won't. I can't be questioned or forced to talk about what you tell
me, even by a court, and I am not allowed to tell it to anyone else
without your permission because I am 100 per cent on your side, and
my job is to work for you and only for you; so everything we talk
about stays just between us. Okay? 0
We consider this example an impressive combination of giving
advice about the law, presented in extremely clear language, while
laying the building blocks of the relationship with the client. But the
assurances this statement offers go beyond what we believe can be
sustained. Certainly this is true if even criminal defense lawyers can
be required to correct client perjury and are expected to "know" when
perjury has been committed. It might be argued that this advice is still
not seriously inaccurate, because the chances that the lawyer will
actually come to possess enough information to know that her client is
lying are very slight.7 1 We do not quarrel with a demanding test for
70. Anthony G. Amsterdam, 1 Trial Manual 4 for the Defense of Criminal Cases §
80 (1984) (used with permission from American Law Institute-American Bar
Association Commission on Continuing Professional Education).
71. Monroe Freedman sees few instances where confidentiality should be
breached, but because of the strong justification for those exceptions (for example, to
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knowledge, as we have already explained.' - But even a demanding
test will sometimes be satisfied. In any event, that is not the only
difficulty with this statement.
A further problem is that the statement makes no mention of the
situations in which a lawyer has discretion, though not an obligation,
to reveal information. It might be argued that the lawyer can still
promise all that this statement does, because even if the lawyer has
the discretion to disclose information in various other circumstances,
she is not bound to exercise her discretion that way. The lawyer who
gives advice like this would do so in good faith if she was herself
committed, for example, never to use her discretion to (1) report
future crimes her client intends to commit; (2) reveal confidential
information to defend herself against a charge of ineffective assistance
of counsel; or (3) reveal confidential information to defend herself
against a claim of conspiracy with her erstwhile client. But we cannot
believe that most lawyers are prepared to forswear such discretion
altogether, and if they are not, they cannot uphold all that this
statement says.
Because we know so little, empirically, about how clients respond to
confidentiality statements, it is impossible to reach absolute
conclusions about the best advice on confidentiality. Nevertheless, we
suggest that the problems in this area can be addressed most
effectively if we recognize that different kinds of advice are
appropriate at different points in the lawyer-client relationship. t We
suggest, in particular, that lawyers should distinguish between the
advice they give at the start of the relationship and the advice they are
prepared to give later on.
At the start of the relationship, we believe lawyers should presume
that their clients are honest and well-intentioned enough to make it
unlikely that any of the exceptions to confidentiality will come into
play. Why should lawyers start from a presumption of client honesty
and decent intentions? If all clients were honest and good, this
presumption would be accurate (and unnecessary), but angels rarely
seek legal representation. It seems likely, in fact, that most clients,
being human, find complete candor with their lawyers very difficult,
and that many clients, again being human, harbor at least some ill
intent towards others. Nonetheless, we think our presumption is the
save a life) and the great unlikelihood that they will actually have to be invoked, he

would not inform clients of their existence. Freedman, supra note 5, at 121-22.
72. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

73. Different kinds of advice may also be appropriate in different types of lawyerclient relationships. For example, experienced clients certainly may not need as much
review of fundamentals as new entrants into the legal realm. Moreover, some matters
on which lawyers are retained are so routine that no advice on confidentiality may be

needed at all, or the chance of any qualifications on confidentiality ever becoming
relevant may be so remote that all mention of these qualifications can be omitted.
We do not, however, believe these exceptions are the rule.
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right one. We say this partly because we believe that many less-thanperfect clients will ultimately conform to this presumption in their
dealings with their lawyer if they have the opportunity to develop a
trusting relationship with her. More importantly, however, we see a
presumption like this as fitting the fundamental characterization of
the lawyer's role, namely that the lawyer is a helper, who helps
because she respects her clients.74
Given that starting presumption, it would be possible to defend the
lawyer's decision to provide unqualified assurances of confidentiality
at the start of the relationship, on the lines of Ms. Washington's
comments. After all, the argument goes, if clients won't encounter
these exceptions, why mention them at all? But we think that this
position is ultimately mistaken.
It is, after all, possible that
confidentiality exceptions will actually come to matter in any given
case, and while we have presumed that that possibility is not a likely
one, we would not describe it as "remote." If there is a real chance
that exceptions will ultimately affect the client's case, then a complete
failure to mention that such exceptions exist entails a form of
deception. To respect another person, we believe, involves assuming
that the other person will benefit from knowledge and not be
corrupted by it. Here, it is a fact that lawyer-client confidentiality is
incomplete, and we do not think this should be denied. We are not
altogether sure that it even can be denied; as we have already seen,
there is modest empirical evidence indicating that clients do not
believe lawyers honor confidentiality absolutely.75
At the initial stage of the relationship,7 6 therefore, we recommend
that the lawyer say something like this:
For me to understand your case and figure out whether I can help
you, I need to know the facts. The law realizes this and realizes that
it is important for you to be able to speak to me fully and frankly.
For that reason, ordinarily everything you tell me is confidential.
That means I won't, and can't, repeat it without your consent. Now,
you should know that this rule, like most rules, has some exceptions,
and if it turns out to be necessary as we go along I will explain these
to you in detail. But normally, as I've already said, what you tell
me-even about things that may be embarrassing or even illegal-is

74. See supra text accompanying note 4.
75. One reason for clients' disbelief may be that many people learn about
confidentiality from sources other than their lawyers, such as television. See
Zacharias, supra note 58, at 383.
76. Here and elsewhere in our discussion, timing is critical. While the dialogue at
the beginning of this chapter, see supra note 1, goes from introductions to painful
revelations in the space of a few pages, in reality lawyer-client interactions commonly
occur in several meetings over a considerable period of time. In general, we believe
that at the beginning of the relationship lawyers can rightly emphasize building trust
more than complete disclosure; in later encounters, there will be more room, and
sometimes there will be more need, for more painful and frank discussions.
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confidential. That lets us talk frankly, which is what we need to do,
and that's what I'd like to begin doing now.

This statement avoids asserting absolute confidentiality-the
It also avoids piling
problem of the Amsterdam formulation.'
qualification on qualification-the problem of the Sobelson
formulation.78 Additionally, we believe, it offers a way to utilize the
advice about confidentiality as a building block in the relationship,
both by emphasizing the very substantial privacy lawyer and client do
enjoy and by promising the lawyer's aid in understanding any limits on
privacy if understanding them becomes necessary. 9 Finally, we
believe this advice, by acknowledging but not belaboring the existence
of exceptions to confidentiality, comports with the presumption of
client honesty and decent intentions. 0
We do not, however, suggest that lawyers should embrace this
presumption blindly. Their hopes may be disappointed, and when this
77. See supra text accompanying note 70.
78. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
79. This advice also promotes the lawyer's search for truth in another way, namely
by repeatedly emphasizing that the lawyer needs the client to be candid so that she
can effectively represent him. This exhortation deserves a moment's examination,
because we have already argued that sometimes a client would be better off if the
lawyer did not know everything. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. We
believe it is appropriate not to raise this possibility at the start of the relationship, in

part because it would be inconsistent with the presumption of client honesty to

suggest at the beginning the possible value of dishonesty. More fundamentally, we do
not think that it is ever appropriate to suggest to the client that he might be better off
lying, because it is hard to see how such a suggestion could be made without directly
increasing the chance of perjury. While we would avoid explicitly stating to a client
that it is always in his interest to tell us everything-because that is not quite true-we
endorse the kinds of statements in the text which make a similar, though not quite so
blunt, argument.
80. As we have already recognized, there are circumstances where a lawyer might
conscientiously decide to skirt the truth in her encounters with her client. See supra
notes 15-24 and accompanying text. The discretion to act in this way, as we have
analyzed it, does not extend to avoiding explicit mention of facts that are staring the
lawyer in the face-facts which, realistically, she already "knows"-but it does
embrace techniques that limit the chance that the lawyer will ever come close to
knowledge. One such technique might be a clear and pointed explanation of
confidentiality exceptions early in the relationship. An immigration lawyer, for
example, might say to her client:
I want to understand what happened to you, and our conversations about
what happened to you are confidential. But when you file your application,
you will have to give the government information about many of the same
things that you and I will be discussing, and what you tell me about these
things you may have to tell the government too.
This statement is accurate as far as it goes (it is still, of course, far from a
comprehensive discussion of confidentiality limits), and it does not invite the client to
lie, but it certainly might encourage such behavior. At the same time, we share
Freedman's sense that this kind of advice at the start of a lawyer-client relationship
may critically undermine the relationship itself. Freedman, supra note 5, at 109-13.
This is a heavy price to pay and a further indication that conscientious lawyers should
think long and hard before embarking on such a course.
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happens, or seems likely to happen, the lawyers may have the
obligation, or at least the discretion, to depart from confidentiality.8'
At this point, we believe the lawyer should explain the matter to the
client by giving the client advice that explicitly calls to his attention
whatever limits on confidentiality are being approached. Otherwise,
the lawyer may not only betray the client but do so behind his back."
We also believe, however, that the lawyer should aim to provide
this supplemental advice about confidentiality before the breach of
confidentiality becomes necessary. Doing so may, of course, teach the
client to be more discreet and assist him in carrying out his plans
without facing disclosure and obstruction-and perhaps selfishly
protect the lawyer from facing a moral dilemma that needs to be
faced. For example:
Client: I am so angry with my father about the way he's ruining our
business that I just can't take it any more. I've just got to get my
money out somehow. I think the only way I can do it is...
Lawyer: [Interrupting] I want you to understand that if you reveal
information to me that indicates you are going to commit a crime I
may have the right to reveal it to the authorities.
It may not really be possible to head off information this way, but in
any case, we do not mean to suggest such a use of advice about
confidentiality as a shield against knowledge. Indeed, this lawyer's
crude intervention suggests that she is perilously near already
"knowing" what she is trying not to hear. We recognize, however,
that even if lawyers do not aim for this result, and do not aim their
advice as this lawyer has, they may sometimes achieve the same result
unintentionally. This we accept, in part because we believe lawyers
should, in the words of the Model Code, "resolve reasonable doubts in
favor of [their] client." 3 We also accept this risk because we see
positive value in the lawyer-client conversations that such disclosures
may trigger. Although we are very skeptical about the value of
extensive dialogue regarding confidentiality limits at the start of the
relationship, we think that lawyers' candid discussion of
confidentiality exceptions-when they are really at issue in a
81. Determining when a confidentiality qualification comes into play is inevitably
a matter for judgment. We offer two general caveats. First, lawyers should be very
reluctant to infer the existence of such problems from generalizations alone (for
instance, Rusty Sabich's assumption that all criminal defendants lie, see supra text
accompanying notes 10-11); they should wait for developments in their particular
case. Second, lawyers should not assume that the client's initially false, or
implausible, story excludes him from the presumption of honesty; we presume that
clients are capable of achieving honesty over time, not that they initially tell all.
82. We recognize that there are probably some cases where covert betrayal is in
fict absolutely necessary and just-for example, where the lawyer discloses her
client's intention to commit a murder and must do so in secret to avoid being
murdered herself.
83. Model Code, supra note 14, EC 7-6.
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particular case-may actually deepen the encounter between lawyer
and client. We see such disclosure as potentially forming the starting
point for the kind of "moral dialogue" between lawyer and client that
may cause the client to refrain from the type of conduct that society
needs disclosed and obstructed.8
Finally, we see such disclosure to head off client misconduct as
consistent with Model Rule 1.2(e). This provision obliges the lawyer
who "knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules
of professional conduct or other law... [to] consult with the client
regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct."' As we
have already indicated, we recommend disclosure not only when the
lawyer anticipates being obliged to breach confidentiality, but also
when she anticipates exercising an authorized discretion to do so. In
both contexts, however, we see the lawyer as acting to prevent a
rupture of the relationship before it becomes irrevocable. We hope
for dialogues like this:
Client: I am so angry with my father about the way he's ruining our
business that I just can't take it any more. I've just got to get my
money out somehow. I think the only way I can do it is to start
fiddling the books.
Lawyer: I think I understand how upsetting it must be to see what
you've worked for being undermined. But do you really think
fiddling the books is a solution?
Client: Yes! Yes, I do! I can do it, and no one will ever be the
wiser.
Lawyer: I don't think you can really count on that.
Client: Why not? You're the only one who knows, and all you have
to do isjust not mention it in any of our documents.
Lawyer: Because fiddled books matter to people, and sooner or
later those people come asking questions. Even if I could "just not
mention it," if you get in trouble with the IRS, say, because some
income turns up missing, or your bankers can't collect on a loan, and
they come after you, well, they may come after me for information,
and-remember when I told you at the start of our working together
that there were some exceptions to lawyer-client confidentiality?
Well, this is one.
Client: I can't believe I'm hearing this.

84. See Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 Cap.

U. L. Rev. 939, 948-49 (1990) (supporting a lawyer-client moral dialogue that is "open

and honest and leave[s] room for meaningful client decision"). We will discuss the
proper contours of moral counseling elsewhere in our book. See supra note 1.
85. Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.2(e).
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Lawyer: You don't have to like it, and for that matter I don't have
to like it either. But it's the law. You can't be sure you'd get away
with this idea, and that's one really good reason why you and I
should try to figure out some better solution.
IV. ADVICE ABOUT THE LAW
The encounter between Ms. Washington and her client might have
turned out very differently if she had responded to the revelation of
his drug-related activities (first hinted at in Cl in the opening
dialogue of this chapter) by explaining the relevant law. Perhaps the
conversation would have proceeded like this:
L12*: Mr. Pojolan, this may be quite a sensitive matter for the INS.
You see, they don't much care if you broke Iraq's economic laws,
but they care a lot about some other matters.
C12*: Sure, but like I told you, it was basically just regular stuff.
L13*: Yes, I understand. But you should know that one thing the
INS cares about a lot is drugs. If you were involved in some kind of
drug crime, your chances of getting asylum go way, way down.
C13*: Do you mean if someone smoked a little pot he couldn't get
asylum?
L14*: Even that would not be a plus. But what would be a big
problem is if you ever helped sell any significant quantity of drugs,
whether it was pot, LSD, heroin, or anything else along those lines.
C14*: Well, that sounds really unfair to me. But it doesn't matter,
because I've never had anything to do with drugs.
The lawyer's role in this dialogue may actually be fairly guileless.
The classic illustration of the use of legal advice to mold client
testimony, however, features interviewing that is entirely strategic. In
Anatomy of a Murder,86 the defense attorney, Paul Biegler, has
already heard his potential client, Lieutenant Manion, admit that he
killed the dead man. As Biegler tells us:
I had reached a point where a few wrong answers to a few right
questions would leave me with a client-if I took his case-whose
cause was legally defenseless. Either I stopped now and begged off
and let some other lawyer worry over it or I asked him the few fatal
questions and let him hang
himself. Or else, like any smart lawyer, I
87
went into the Lecture.
Then Biegler explains "the Lecture":
The Lecture is an ancient device that lawyers use to coach their
86. Robert Traver, Anatomy of a Murder (St Martin's Press 1958).
87. Id. at 32.
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clients so that the client won't quite know he has been coached and
his lawyer can still preserve the face-saving illusion that he hasn't
done any coaching. For coaching clients, like robbing them, is not
only frowned upon, it is downright unethical and bad, very bad.
Hence the Lecture, an artful device as old as the law itself....'
In this particular case, the Lecture consists of an explanation of the
absolute necessity of presenting a plausible legal defense and the
elimination, one by one, of all the available defenses except oneinsanity. Lieutenant Manion takes the bait, and Biegler explains what
an insanity claim is and how long someone acquitted on this basis
might spend in a mental hospital. After one last enticement, in which
Biegler appeals to his client's willingness to take a "calculated risk,"
Biegler is finished. He waits. His client utters the magic words:
"Maybe," he said, "maybe I was insane." After Manion manages,
with some prompting, to provide suitable answers to the various
questions entailed in this defense (for example, by "revealing" that he
only assumes he killed the victim, because he can't remember the
crucial moments), Biegler is satisfied that his client has a defense."
Interviewing of this sort has no place in a relationship in which the
lawyer aims to learn the truth. But we cannot simply forbid lawyers to
explain the law to their clients. On the contrary, lawyers are supposed
to explain the law to their clients. In this context, we face an instance
of a more general problem, namely the unfortunate truth that
knowledge of the law may enable a client to violate it.9 ' Here, in
8&. Id. at 35.
89. Id. at 46.
90. Id. at 48-49.
91. Both the Model Code and the Model Rules forbid lawyers from counseling or
assisting their clients to commit at least some unlawful conduct. Model Code, supra
note 14, DR 7-102(A)(7) (prohibiting the lawyer from assisting "conduct that the
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent"); Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 1.2(d)
(forbidding the lawyer to assist "conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent"). As Stephen Pepper emphasizes, however, the Model Rule, but not its
Code counterpart, also declares that "a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct with a client." Stephen L Pepper, Counseling at the
Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudenceand Ethics of Lawyering, 104 Yale
LJ. 1545, 1587 (1995) (quoting Model Rule 1.2(d)).
Pepper has argued that this proviso authorizes a lawyer to discuss the legal
consequences of any course of action, including the practical likelihood or
unlikelihood of sanctions, regardless of whether the result is in effect to encourage the
client to violate the law. Id. at 1588-91. Whether or not this reading of the Model
Rule is correct-and Pepper notes that some commentators have taken different
views, see id. at 1589 n.89-he does not believe that lawyers should give any and all
conceivable advice about law to their clients, regardless of the impact on the legal
order. See generally id at 1598-1610 (advocating a "rebuttable presumption that it is
generally appropriate for the lawyer to educate the client concerning the law" and
urging lawyers to consider the legal issues involved while also engaging the client in a
discussion aimed at "assist[ing] the client as a person first and as a legal problem
second"). We agree. We would not, for example, inform a perjurious client that one
option available to him is to discharge us and find another lawyer to whom he can tell
only his perjured story, nor-if the client raised this idea himself-would we inform
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Anatomy of a Murder, the particular violation at issue is, essentially,
perjury (or some related form of concealment of the truth in a legal
context) - to say nothing of perhaps getting away with murder as a
result.
As in the context of advice about confidentiality, however, we
believe that the tension between truth-seeking and law-advising does
not have to be resolved by favoring one value to the exclusion of the
other.' Instead, we suggest that, again, timing is crucial. As we will
explain when we lay out the basics of interviewing elsewhere in our
book,93 the lawyer's first task in eliciting the truth is to hear the client's
story as the client wishes to tell it. Her second task is to explore the
details of the story the client has told, for example by getting the
chronology clear and by looking for related points that the client has
not initially mentioned.
In carrying out this second task, the lawyer can and must look for
facts that will sustain, or block, particular legal theories that might be
relevant to the case. Even this may signal to the client what he should
"remember." For example, a lawyer interviewing the victim of an
automobile accident will surely want to know the client's physical
symptoms; when she asks the client, "By the way, do you have any
lower back pain?" the client may speedily invent some.94 We think
this risk is worth running, because without such specific, and
somewhat suggestive, questions, important facts may never be
discovered. But we see no need, at this point, for the lawyer to
compound the leading effect of her questions by buttressing them with
a description of the legal rules she is testing.
Ms. Washington, in the version of the dialogue at the beginning of
this chapter, pursues essentially this strategy. Here, the danger is not
that the client will invent but that he will deny, and the danger is quite
substantial, because it is evident and not surprising that the client
him that he would probably be able to get away with this scheme (even if that were
so). But advice to a client about the substantive legal rules affecting his case is far
from such danger zones.
92. As with the case with advice about confidetiality, see supra note 80, the
resolution of the tension between truth-seeking and law-advising may be different if
the lawyer is exercising her discretion, within the rules of ethics, not to aim for the
truth. Even then, the advice Biegler gives would be unacceptable because it too
nearly approaches, if indeed it does not cross, the line of subornation of perjury. On
the other hand, the lawyer's advice in the dialogue in this Part (L13*, L14*) might be
appropriate. The lawyer in this dialogue, unlike Biegler, does not have a clear
indication of what the unpleasant truth actually is; she is by no means so plainly
avoiding what she already virtually knows. Moreover, and again unlike Biegler, the
lawyer here shows little artifice; she bluntly explains the law to her client but does not
elaborately steer him around it.
93. See supra note 1.
94. My co-author Ann Shalleck has pointed out such a moment in the movie
Philadelphia, (Columbia Tristar 1993), where the lawyer portrayed by Denzel
Washington responds in this manner after accepting a rather weak personal injury

claim.
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already suspects drug transporting could be a big legal problem for
him. Ms. Washington's job is to get past the client's resistance to
telling the truth, and she accomplishes this by using various forms of
pressure. 95 Her job would surely be harder if she first verified the
client's suspicions about the legal peril he faced, by explaining exactly
what the relevant law provided.
When all of this work is done, however, the process of interviewing
and counseling the client is far from over. The client is entitled to
know where he stands legally, and that will involve telling him what
the facts he has laid out mean, and why. At this point, the client may
offer new facts. Perhaps we should say that the client may offer new
"facts," to emphasize that these new claims may be false. But we do
not assume that all clients will respond by changing their stories. Nor
do we assume that any new facts the clients do offer are necessarily
false, even if they favor the client's story and contradict earlier
accounts the client has given. 96 Memories are faulty and may actually
be refreshed or restored over time. Even if the issue is not one of
memory but of veracity, it has often been pointed out that clients may
lie out of a misunderstanding of the law and reveal the truth only
when they are informed of the law's true provisions29 More generally,
we should recognize that clients may not initially trust their lawyers
and therefore may lie first, only to tell the truth later.
Another incident in the Anatomy of a Murder interview helps
illuminate the lawyer's duty when a client's story changes. The
defendant, Lieutenant Manion, having learned that killing his wife's
rapist cannot be excused on grounds of provocation if the killing is
only done when the rape is already in the past, 98has an idea of his own
for his defense:
The Lieutenant's eyes narrowed and flickered ever so little.
"Maybe," he began, and cleared his throat. "On second thought,
maybe I did catch Quill in the act. I've never precisely told the
police one way or the other." His eyes regarded me quietly,
steadily...99
Biegler rejects this revision of the story, and certainly he has good
reason to believe that Manion is lying. But his reason should not be
simply that Manion's second story differs from his first. We recognize
that by postponing the discussion of the law until after the basic
95. For a discussion of techniques for eliciting the truth, see infra Part VI.
96. Contradiction is, of course, not inevitable; sometimes newly-reported facts
may simply embellish the details already reported, and sometimes they may be
inconsistent with the overall tenor of the earlier story but not actually contradict
anything already said.
97. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 5, at 109-10 (offering the example of a client
who denied she had committed a killing, because she did not realize that the truthful
account she later revealed would demonstrate that the killing was in self-defense).
98. Traver, supra note 86, at 37.
99. Id.
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interviewing is over, the lawyer following our model may increase the
chance that she will hear her client assert new facts whose veracity she
will have some reason to doubt."° We believe it is better for lawyers
to take this risk and evaluate their clients' claims with all the data at
their disposal-including such features as the narrowing and flickering
of the eyes-rather than invite the same possible fabrication to occur
earlier or deny the client, later, an understanding of the law under
which he lives. 101
V. RESPECT AND INQUIRY

How skeptical should lawyers be of their clients' veracity? In the
interview excerpt that begins this chapter, Ms. Washington does not

set out to uncover the drug delivery problem. Her question about
how Mr. Pojolan lived during the six months he waited to get out of
Iraq (L10) seems entirely explicable as part of an effort to get a
complete account of the hardships he has suffered. But when the
100. We also recognize that by withholding this information until this stage, the
lawyer will put those clients who do not understand the law at a disadvantage
compared with veterans of the legal system who do understand it. The veterans will
be able to produce either relevant truthful information at once, thereby avoiding later
questions about their veracity, or false "information" instead, but again more
credibly. We do not believe, however, that this inequality should be remedied by
routinely offering advice about the law that can so easily encourage people to lie and
get away with it.
101. Our position on advice about the law-essentially, that such advice should be
given but in a way that reduces the danger of abuse by the client-is also our position
on a variety of other steps lawyers will rightly take to insure that their clients'
testimony is as informed as possible. The proposed Restatement considers the
following forms of witness preparation appropriate, and all of these have a role with
those witnesses who are clients as well:
[D]iscussing the role of the witness and effective courtroom demeanor;
discussing the witness's recollection and probable testimony; revealing to the
witness other testimony or evidence that will be presented and asking the
witness to reconsider the witness's recollection or recounting of events in
that light; discussing the applicability of law to the events in issue; reviewing
the factual context into which the witness's observations or opinions will fit;
reviewing documents or other physical evidence that may be introduced; and
discussing probable lines of hostile cross-examination that the witness should
be prepared to meet.
Restatement, supra note 8, § 176 cmt. b. For an example of how to employ such tools
without distorting the truth-in this instance, by presenting another witness's account
not all at once but through "successive questions that reveal one bit at a time, taking
care not to reveal any more than is needed to refresh [the witness's] memory"-see
Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 40-41
(1995).
It deserves emphasis, however, that preparing a client to testify is not the same as
interviewing him (though there is certainly some overlap between the two tasks).
Some steps that the proposed Restatement also approves, such as "rehearsal of
testimony" and "suggest[ing] choice of words that might be employed to make the
witness's meaning clear," Restatement, supra note 8, § 176 cmt. b, clearly do not have
a place in an initial interview aimed at truth, and the same may be true of a number of
the other methods cited above.
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client responds with his quasi-admission of carrying some stuff that
wasn't "regular," Ms. Washington pursues the issue and refuses to let
go of it until she has extracted what turns out to be a disastrous
admission of drug transporting. Should she have let up earlier?
In many interviews-and to some extent in this one-the question
of whether to press or not to press the client probably does not arise.
Good interviewing entails hearing the client's story and eliciting
relevant details he may have omitted or forgotten. To some extent,
such interviewing inevitably tests the client's credibility, for such
questioning tests whether the client's original story and subsequent
elaborations have the ring of truth. But questions of this sort would
be necessary whether or not there was a client credibility issue, so they
require no special justification in terms of the principle of respect for
client honesty. Ms. Washington, for example, having heard her
prospective client strongly hint that he had sometimes transported
some sort of illegal goods, could hardly have omitted an inquiry into
what these goods were; to realize that the client engaged in some sort
of illegal conduct but not check what the conduct was would simply be
incomplete.
In many interviews, however, there are probably points at which the
client offers information that might or might not be complete. Here,
for example, when Ms. Washington presses Mr. Pojolan to clarify
what kind of "stuff" he was transporting (L12), he answers, "Well,
mostly it was just food, clothes, rugs-really all right, perfectly legal."
(C13). This statement is quite clearly incomplete, and Mr. Pojolan
goes on to fill in the gaps. But suppose he had answered Ms.
Washington's question about his work (L11) by saying: "I drove a
truck for them, making pick-ups and deliveries. We carried a bunch
of stuff, mostly food and clothes, also some rugs." This answer could
be complete and responsive. If that was how it sounded to the lawyer,
and if there were no related loose ends that needed further inquiry as
a matter of thorough, normal interviewing, then we believe that Ms.
Washington would have no reason to press the matter further. She
would not need to respond, for example, "All that is no problem. But
did you transport any drugs?" because she would have no reason to
suspect that he did. Having no reason for such a question, in fact, she
probably ought not to ask it, both because time is limited, and because
random probing for impropriety is disrespectful to the client."~
102. We would not, however, consider it "random probing" for her to ask her
client, at some concluding point in the interview, whether there are any other
problems in his case of which he is aware. Nor, of course, is it random probing to ask
a question-for example, "Have you ever been engaged in drug trafficking?"-if the
client will probably or definitely have to answer that same question from the other
side. But the reason for asking the question in such a context is that someone else is
going to ask it anyway, not that some aspect of the client's story independently would
have called for further inquiry by his own lawyer. The time and manner of asking
questions of this sort might also be different from the approach the lawyer takes to
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In taking this position, we agree with Geoffrey Hazard and W.
William Hodes who argue in their Model Rules handbook, The Law
of Lawyering, that normally a lawyer
gives advice, negotiates, and helps consummate transactions on the
basis of the facts presented to her by her client, not the facts that a
thoroughgoing hostile investigation might reveal. Even where there
is room for doubt about some of the details, a lawyer ordinarily
demonstrates proper loyalty and zeal by giving a client the benefit of
that doubt. 0 3
The Model Code suggests a similar principle (though there is no
counterpart provision in the Model Rules), when it declares that "[i]n
many cases a lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of his
client, and in those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in
favor of his client."'' " Put differently, we might say that the lawyer's
duty to the truth requires her to seek it even from her client, but her
duty to her client ordinarily requires her not to transmute that search
into a search for lies.
We also agree with Hazard and Hodes, however, that there is a
point at which the failure to recognize a fact becomes a deliberate
evasion of knowledge, and at that point, the lawyer is acting
improperly. 1 5 Moreover, there is surely a substantial area between
the extremes of treating one's own client as an adversary and giving
him a license to lie. In this substantial area, we believe lawyers have
discretion to inquire and generally should do so when they feel they
have significant grounds for uneasiness about their client's account.
In other words, while we agree that lawyers should resolve reasonable
doubts in favor of their clients, we do not believe that lawyers should
passively accept whatever account their client gives so long as it is not
definitively proven to be false. They should, in general, ask questions
first and give the benefit of the doubt afterwards. 1°6
In the opening dialogue, Ms. Washington was probably operating in
this zone of discretion almost from the moment the topic of the
"[ir]regular" shipments came up. The client's almost immediate
request for reassurance about confidentiality signaled his own anxiety
the core task of understanding what has happened to her client.
103. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 403, at INTRO-27 (2d ed.
Supp. 1998).
104. Model Code, supra note 14, EC 7-6.
105. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 103, § 402 at INTRO-26.
106. Here we may differ from Hazard and Hodes. Professor Hodes has written
elsewhere that "the lawyer should trust the client all the way up to the point of
knowledge that the client is up to no good." W. William Hodes, The ProfessionalDuty
to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 Tex. Tech L.
Rev. 1343, 1355 (1999). We would not see trust as something to be turned on and off
in the way this statement might imply; instead, our view is that the lawyer should trust
her client to be capable of telling the truth and work with the client to help him do so.
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(C12), and the incomplete, but pregnant, answer he gave after
receiving this reassurance would not have reassured his lawyer (C13).
His response to her next question (C14)-telling her that the truck
owner never told him what was in the truck-seems to offer a
potential escape from the problem (namely, a defense of ignorance),
but the lawyer's next question (L15)-a leading question that tries to
lock that defense in"4 7-elicits the unwelcome news that Mr. Pojolan
does know what he was carrying. We think a failure to follow up
further at this point would have amounted to a deliberate avoidance
of knowledge. In short, we believe Ms. Washington was right to
pursue this matter, even though her focus on it surely implied that she
did not fully accept her client's honesty or entirely accord him the
respect an honest person would merit. 108
VI. TECHNIQUES FOR PURSUING THE TRUTH
We come now to the question of techniques for inquiry. When the
lawyer believes she must press the client for the truth, how should she
do it? In the opening dialogue, Ms. Washington employs several
techniques. She reassures her client about confidentiality (more than
she should have, as we have explained) (L13, L19). She asks her
questions repeatedly, resisting her client's efforts to get her to accept
half-answers (L12, L16-L18, and L23).
She asks very specific

107. Her question is not ferociously leading. She might have said, for example,
"Now this is a very important point. You really don't know what you were carrying,
do you, since you were never told?" But what the lawyer does ask is still a leading
question, on a point that is far from clear when she asks about it. As such, her
question does not fit well in an interview aimed at truth.
Even without resorting to leading questions, lawyers can influence their clients'
answers by shading the questions they ask. Wydick reports social scientific findings
demonstrating that even slight variations in the phrasing of questions can influence
the answers. Wydick, supra note 101, at 43. While we do not believe lawyers should
ordinarily shape their questions so as to press the client in particular directions, we do
not endorse "neutral" phrasing as completely as Wydick may. See id.Suppose, for
example, that a client says, "I was in a terrible crash. This guy's car slammed into
me." A thoroughly neutral, disengaged follow-up question might be, -Can you
estimate the speed of the other car at the time of the accident?" But that question
might imply that the lawyer does not accept the client's statement that he was in a
"crash." The lawyer who wants her client to feel heard and believed needs to respond
in the key in which the client has spoken: for example, "How fast was the car going
when it crashed into you?" She may need to go on and ask a series of follow-up
questions to appraise the client's basis for giving whatever estimate he gave, but her
route to the truth should also be a route to a productive relationship with her client.
108. A lawyer who has decided to exercise her discretion to skirt the truth might
handle the issues discussed in this part quite differently. She might be slower to
inquire about matters on which she is skeptical and correspondingly quicker to
resolve doubts in her client's favor. If she did inquire, she might do so in a
deliberately slanted way, hoping to elicit the answers she needs rather than those she
fears. Such steps have many potential costs, but conscientious lawyers may
sometimes believe these costs are less severe than the alternative of eliciting
information whose discovery will lead to injustice.
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questions (for example, "And how much? How much each time?"
(L22)) and sometimes uses closed-ended questions, calling for yes-orno answers (L17). She asks her questions emphatically when she feels
her client is being particularly evasive (L17, L23). Her approach to
her client grows less friendly as the client continues to stall on
admitting the full truth. When she begins these inquiries, she offers a
little reassurance and even a hint of apology for her questions ("I'm
not sure I understand. Was some of the stuff you were carrying not
what you call 'regular stuff'?" (L12)), but by the end she is peppering
her client with specific, grim questions. Near the end she adds
sarcasm ("Did you get paid extra for this favor?" (L26)).
Broadly speaking, we approve of all these techniques. When the
lawyer feels she must pursue the possibility that her client is lying or
evading, she must reckon with the likelihood of client resistance, and
her methods of overcoming that resistance may have to be firm or
even aggressive. Ms. Washington certainly had ample reason to
conclude that her client was being evasive. Moreover, while Ms.
Washington was not gentle with her client, she also did not break faith
with him. She used no tricks, offered no false promises (except for her
unqualified assurances of confidentiality), and made no threats that
she could not properly have carried out. 109
While the kinds of techniques Ms. Washington uses are legitimate,
we think she could have done a better job. She elicited the truth, but
perhaps not the whole truth; conceivably there were mitigating
circumstances surrounding Mr. Pojolan's drug transporting or other
related immigration issues that would have been worth ascertaining in
support of his asylum application, but Ms. Washington's focus seems
to have shifted from building his case to demonstrating that he didn't
have one.110 Had she avoided that unconscious shift in orientation,
she might have learned more by using techniques that were somewhat
less prosecutorial in style.
We do not suggest that gentler approaches are always right, because
they are not. They do, however, have a great virtue: they are less
likely to disrupt the emotional relationship between lawyer and client.
Sometimes, a gentler method may also be more effective; some clients
may respond only to a lawyer whom they perceive as an ally and may
shrink back from revelations to anyone who acts like something else.
Additionally, we suspect that a practice of adopting aggressive
approaches to one's own client may reflect, or promote, a disposition
109. Her threat not to take the case if the client did not tell her the truth is certainly
one she could have carried out, at least unless she were the "last lawyer in town."
Lawyers have broad discretion to take or decline cases. See Model Code, supra note
14, EC 2-26; Model Rules, supra note 32, R. 6.2 cmt.
110. Even if the information Ms. Washington uncovers happens to be fatal, most of
the harmful information lawyers learn is probably not fatal, only damaging, and
lawyers need to know it in order to mitigate the damage.
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not to believe him, and we see that disposition as imperiling the
lawyer's performance of her duty to resolve reasonable doubts in the
client's favor. We think these considerations support a general
preference for using gentler, less confrontational techniques first,
rather than methods more characteristic of cross-examination or even
interrogation. We do not believe, however, that any techniques
consistent with good faith can be ruled out altogether. Instead, we
believe that the lawyer should have a broad repertoire of techniques
and choose from them in light of the situation before her. We offer
here a brief catalogue of such techniques:
(a) Testing the hypothesis that the client is lying: Normal, basic
interviewing elicits the client's story and then pursues various
hypotheses guided by the lawyer's tentative legal theories."' If the
issue in a particular case is whether the client can demonstrate that
the contractor who built his garage was negligent, for instance, the
lawyer would then ask the client about facts that would tend to
demonstrate or disprove this theory (for example, how often did the
client see the contractor actually on the site, supervising his
employees?). Normally in such questioning, the lawyer is not directly
seeking to test the hypothesis that the client is lying, but if need be,
that can become a central part of the lawyer's focus.
Suppose, for example, that a defendant says he was beaten
repeatedly by the police, and the lawyer is uneasy about the truth of
this claim. She might reason that if the client really was beaten
repeatedly, he should be able to tell a story of, for example, which
rooms he was beaten in, by whom, and how many times. Certainly the
client's memory of these details may be fuzzy, but if he can offer no
details at all, there may be cause for doubting the client's allegations.
Similarly, she might reason that an asylum client who says he was
tortured during months of confinement in a prison known for its bad
sanitation should be able to remember not just his torture but also
either the abominable smell that would have assailed him constantly,
or the daily routine of the prison; the client who remembers none of
this may never have been imprisoned at all." 2 The lawyer should not
put absolute faith in such inferences, but she should not ignore them
either. Techniques such as these may be quite effective, both because
they are not bluntly confrontational and because they approach the
client's story from angles that a lying client might not anticipate.
(b) Empathy and Reassurance: As a general proposition, we believe
that a positive relationship between lawyer and client improves
communication between them. Broadly, a lawyer is more likely to
hear the truth if the client trusts her to stay on his side and not to add
111. For a thoughtful articulation of the ways that lawyers can formulate the
hypotheses that will guide their questioning, see David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as
Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach 145-64 (1991).
112. This example was suggested to me by an INS asylum supervisor.
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her condemnation to the judgments of the client's adversaries or of
society at large. This remains true even when the required
communications become more painful. Building such a relationship
is, of course, the function of interviewing and counseling tools, such as
empathy. Paying personal attention to the client's well-being can
contribute to such trust.113 Offering nonjudgmental empathetic regard
can have a powerful impact as well.1 14 Expressing approval of, or
agreement with, the client's perspectives can also be helpful, though it
has important pitfalls.11 5
Providing clearly-phrased and
sympathetically-reasoned explanations of why the lawyer feels the
client is not telling the truth, and of how falsehoods may damage the
client's interests, may also be valuable. These are important
techniques of ordinary interaction with clients, and they are no less
important here.
(c) Role-play and other techniques for client participation: The
techniques mentioned in the previous section build connections
between lawyer and client, but they share a common feature that is
not necessarily a strength: all of them turn on what the lawyer says to
the client. We are impressed with the power of techniques that enable
clients to say more, both as tools to affect clients' thinking and as ways
to empower the clients in their own cases. 16 The lawyer might, for

example, ask the client how he would respond to the client's own story
if he were on the other side; this is the technique Rusty Sabich's
lawyer uses in the excerpt quoted earlier." 7 The client might just
articulate the arguments, or he might deliver them in role-taking the
part of the prosecutor, for example, in an upcoming arraignment." 8
Alternatively, the client might be asked to play himself for an
audience that he accepts as disinterested, so that he can experience, in
the safety of the lawyer's office, the likely reaction to his performance.
In all of these settings, clients who may be unable to come to grips
with their situation in back-and-forth discussions with the lawyer may
find deeper resources of performance and understanding.
113. Amsterdam, supra note 70, §§ 77,79, 88.
114. Binder et al., supra note 111, at 40-42; see Thomas L. Shaffer & James R.
Elkins, Legal Interviewing and Counseling in a Nutshell 65-72 (3d ed. 1997).
115. See generally Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 Hastings L.J. 991
(1992) (analyzing the value of expressing "approval" as a tool in building lawyerclient relationships, and suggesting guidelines for its use).
116. See generally Mary Marsh Zulack, Rediscovering Client Decisionmaking: The
Impact of Role-Playing, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 593 (1995) (examining the impact of roleplaying on client decision-making and client capacity for action).
117. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. A related technique is for the
lawyer to identify the problems in the client's story, but to do so in the role of the
adversary-thereby somewhat increasing the chance that the client will not resent his
own lawyer who is actually speaking, but the adversary whose words the lawyer
imagines and delivers. Still another variation, one that might insulate the lawyer
herself from the resentment that even a simulation could engender, is to have the
adversary played by one of the lawyer's colleagues.
118. See Zulack, supra note 116, at 631 n.42.
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(d) Cross-examinationand confrontation: Many of the techniques
Ms. Washington uses fall into this category. Techniques with the
flavor of cross-examination include the use of narrow and leading
questions; short, fast, and insistent series of questions; questions that
confront the answerer with his own prior inconsistencies; and
questions that confront the answerer with the inconsistent evidence of
other sources. 119

On a somewhat different dimension, questioners may seek to
convey their skepticism and disbelief through the way they ask their
questions and the way they connect to, or pull back from, the client.
The lawyer might move back in her seat, stand up and pace, roll her
eyes, or-a technique mentioned by Anthony Amsterdam-silently
write extended notes while not looking at the client, in response to
some remark she finds implausible.' In general, good interviewing
normally includes feedback and encouragement as well as connection
on many different levels with the client, but the lawyer may also need
to turn off all these sources of reassurance and approval. More
bluntly, the lawyer may say to the client, in so many words, "Don't
bullshit me."
While we believe that techniques drawn from the realm of crossexamination do have a place in pursuing the truth with a client, we
suggest two guidelines about their use. First, few witnesses welcome
cross-examination, and few clients will feel warmer towards their
lawyer as a result of experiencing cross-examination at her hands.
The more direct the confrontation, in general, the greater the risk.
Second, courtroom advocacy is aimed at convincing the finder of fact,
but in the interview room there is no finder of fact except the lawyer
and the client. Their task, if possible, is to come to a shared
understanding about the truth of the case. While a cross-examiner
may be delighted to elicit evidence that can later be used to
demonstrate the witness's falsity to the jury and may deliberately
avoid putting that inference to the itness so as to avoid having the
witness somehow defuse it, there is little point in such maneuvering
with one's own client. The lawyer who discerns falsity vill ultimately
need to discuss it openly with her client.
(e) Coercion: We might hesitate to include "coercion" in a list of
techniques that lawyers can use on their own clients. No less an
authority than the Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that
coercion in the service of preventing client perjury can be the lawyer's
duty.
In Nix v. Whiteside,"' the Supreme Court considered
Whiteside's claim that his criminal defense lawyer breached his Sixth
119. For useful guidance on these and other techniques of cross-examination, see
Marilyn J. Berger et al., Trial Advocacy: Planning, Analysis and Strategy 356-66
(1989).
120. Amsterdam, supra note 70, § 81.
121. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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Amendment right to counsel by forcing him not to give testimony that
would have supported his claim of killing in self-defense. According
to the Court:
Until shortly before trial, Whiteside consistently stated to
Robinson [his attorney] that he had not actually seen a gun, but that
he was convinced that Love [whom Robinson had stabbed to death]
had a gun in his hand. About a week before trial, during
preparation for direct examination, Whiteside for the first time told
Robinson... that he had seen something "metallic" in Love's hand.
When asked about this, Whiteside responded:
"[I]n Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a
gun, I'm dead."
Robinson told Whiteside that such testimony would be perjury and
repeated that it was not necessary to prove that a gun was available
but only that Whiteside reasonably believed that he was in danger.
On Whiteside's insisting that he would testify that he saw
"something metallic" Robinson told him, according to Robinson's
testimony:
"[W]e could not allow him to [testify falsely] because that would
be perjury, and as officers of the court we would be suborning
perjury if we allowed him to do it; ... I advised him that if he
did do that it would be my duty to advise the Court of what he
was doing and that I felt he was committing perjury; also, that I
probably would be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular
testimony."
Robinson also indicated that he would seek to withdraw 1 from the
representation if Whiteside insisted on committing perjury. 2
Whiteside ultimately took the stand but omitted the testimony his
lawyer felt would have been perjury.1 23
In short, Whiteside's lawyer threatened to inform the judge that he
felt Whiteside was committing perjury, to attempt to impeach
Whiteside's testimony himself, and if need be to seek to withdraw
from the case, which was about to go to trial. Whiteside yielded to
these threats and to his counsel's argument that the testimony he had
in mind was unnecessary. All of this the Supreme Court approved:
Whether Robinson's conduct is seen as a successful attempt to
dissuade his client from committing the crime of perjury, or whether
seen as a "threat" to withdraw from representation and disclose the
illegal scheme, Robinson's representation of Whiteside falls well
within accepted standards of professional conduct and the range of

122. Id. at 160-61 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 161-62.
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reasonable professional conduct acceptable under [the Sixth
Amendment] .... 124

If such tactics are considered legitimate ones to use in the effort to
dissuade perjury, we infer that similar means must also be considered
legitimate in trying to elicit the truth from the client in the first
instance. We do not find this shocking. Seeking the truth from one's
client is important and at times may be very difficult indeed.
Nevertheless, we do not find tactics such as these desirable. They
inevitably breed resentment on the client's part, and may poison the
attorney-client relationship irreparably. They may also be used
mistakenly. Although we are inclined to agree that Whiteside's
lawyer knew his client was contemplating perjury, even in this case
there is still some room for doubt. Finally, and most importantly, we
do not assume that the difficulties of eliciting the truth are best
resolved by coercion. Building a stronger and more trusting attorneyclient relationship is surely preferable whenever it can be
accomplished.
CONCLUSION

We have concluded with a discussion of techniques for eliciting the
truth from reluctant clients. Many of these techniques are somewhat
troubling to lawyers accustomed to the ethics of respect for clients and
client-centeredness. We share that discomfort, and we do not list
these techniques in order to recommend their frequent use. Instead,
our hope is that the techniques of normal interviewing described
elsewhere in our book,121 and the particular techniques of truthseeking described earlier in this chapter, such as proper advice about
confidentiality and proper discussion of the applicable law, will enable
most lawyers and most clients to communicate effectively, and
truthfully, without resort to more intrusive techniques. Nonetheless,
difficult situations are among the situations lawyers face, and we
should not shrink from understanding the techniques necessary to
deal with them.

124. d at 171.

125. See supra note 1.
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